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INTRODUCTION
B
enjamin Franklin, famous polymath of the 18th cen-
tury and one of the Founding Fathers of the United
States, once said, “In this world nothing is certain except
death and taxes”. Strangely enough, while we intuitively
accept that there are few things in life one can be
absolutely sure of, our minds nonetheless seem to have
a strong inclination towards creating impressions of cer-
tainty (Gigerenzer 2002). Perhaps, because of our human
need to make sense of life events, we prefer to see struc-
ture instead of chaos, cause and effect instead of chance,
and certainty rather than uncertainty. As a result incom-
plete or ambiguous information detected by our senses
is often ‘sold’ to our consciousness as a definite product
(Gigerenzer 2002). This process is strongly influenced by
our prior beliefs, which means that what we see is often
determined by our mental model of what should be. In a
phrase - “believing is seeing!” Have a look at this picture
(Figure 1). Do you see Bill Clinton and Al Gore? Wrong!
It’s Bill Clinton and Bill Clinton. Because you are so used
to seeing pictures of the for-
mer US President accompa-
nied by his Vice-President,
your mind in an attempt to
make sense of the visual
image ignored the fact that
the faces in the picture are in
fact identical. Things are not
always what they seem to be.
Sometimes certainty can be
nothing but an illusion.
Given that we seem to be hard-wired for certainty,
we might reflect for a moment on what value this may
hold for us. Firstly, certainty can play a role in promoting
our integration into a particular social group or culture.
The desire for acceptance into a group may necessitate
our adopting certain beliefs, values or practices without
question. Certainty may also bring us hope or comfort in
times of hardship or suffering. Think, for example, of the
consolation in bereavement we derive from religious
beliefs about the afterlife. A further benefit of certainty is
its effect on our performance. The sportsman who con-
vinces himself of his ability to win, finds that he is able to
mobilise his inner resources and perform at a higher
level than one who is gripped by self-doubt. You may be
able to add to this list of benefits.
But certainty also has a dark side. Some of the most
dangerous people in history have been those who were
so certain of their special status or beliefs that they
were moved to marginalise, injure or eliminate people
who differed from them. Hitler, for example, was abso-
lutely certain that his actions were needed to rid the
world of evil. George Bush felt sure that God told him
to invade Iraq to find and destroy weapons of mass de-
struction. The rest is history.  
CERTAINTY AND UNCERTAINTY 
IN HEALTH CARE
W
hat about certainty in health care? Let’s explore
two examples from antiquity to set the scene.
Colonic cleansing by means of enemas was used in Egypt
as far back as 1 500 BC and the practice was known to
be widespread in the ancient world, including China,
India and Babylon. It was believed this treatment was
necessary to rid the human body of toxins acquired
from food. According to the Roman Naturalist, Pliny,
the Egyptians got the idea from the ibis that was fre-
quently seen using its long beak to wash the inside of its
body with infusions of water from the River Nile
(Editorial 1946). 
In pre-revolutionary France enemas were used on a
daily basis after dinner. They were thought to be good for
skin complexion, maintenance of health and as a treat-
ment for a variety of diseases. Louis XIV, for instance,
apparently used enemas about 2 000 times during his life-
time and as a result stayed healthy for his entire life (or
so it is believed). A large number of concoctions have
been used in enemas over the years, such as salt water,
bile, vinegar, wine, beer, oil, honey and even coffee!  
By the beginning of the 20th century scientific evi-
dence had accumulated that ‘autointoxication’ - the theo-
ry providing the rationale for colonic cleansing - was seri-
ously flawed. Evidence was also available that the risks of
the procedure outweighed any potential benefits. As a
result the medical profession led by the American Medical
Association strongly discouraged its use (Ernst 1997). 
Yet today the practice remains common in many
Western countries and, in fact, there has even been a
resurgence of interest in this treatment in recent years.
Alternative health practitioners in the US charge around
$100 for a colonic irrigation and many celebrities are
queuing up to have the procedure. Modern-day indica-
tions for colon cleansing comprise a wide array of con-
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4ditions, such as alcoholism, allergies, arthritis, asthma,
backache, bad breath, bloating, coated tongue, colitis,
constipation, fatigue, gas, headache, hypercholesterole-
mia, hypertension and skin problems. 
The strong belief in the value of colonic therapy is
summed up in the report I found on one website: 
“The life of 109-year-old Norman W Walker, DSc,
PhD, is testimony that colon cleansing is essential to
your health. Dr Walker, ….stated emphatically, ‘It is
impossible when we eat two, three or more meals in
a day not to have residue accumulating in the colon.
Not to cleanse the colon is like having the entire
garbage collecting staff in your city go on strike for
days on end!’” 
(http://swiftweb.com/ha/colonic.html; 
accessed 26 August, 2006).
Before commenting on this example I would like to
mention another - bloodletting (Trohler 2000). During
the 19th century bloodletting was used as a cure for
most infections. For instance, during the 1832 cholera
epidemic in France, patients were starved and subjected
to bloodletting by venesection and leeching. The prac-
tice of bloodletting was based on the theory that red-
ness, heat and swelling seen in cases of inflammation
were due to an excess of blood that led to a build-up of
pressure. It seemed logical that the removal of blood
would lessen the pressure and cure the inflammation. If
the swelling was local, blood could be removed by
leeches. In the case of general inflammation manifesting
as a red face, general fever and strong pulse, venesec-
tion was needed to remove larger amounts of blood. 
In 1835 a Parisian physician Pierre Louis published the
results of his systematic observations of groups of pa-
tients and concluded (somewhat heretically) that blood-
letting was not all it had been trumped up to be. Despite
these findings the practice of bloodletting continued for a
further 100 years! Even Sir William Osler, one of the
most influential doctors in history, wrote in 1892: 
“… during the last decades we have certainly bled
too little. Pneumonia is one of the diseases in which
a timely venesection may save life. To be of service it
should be done early. In a full-blooded, healthy man
with a high fever and bounding pulse the abstraction
of from twenty to thirty ounces of blood is in
every way beneficial” 
(Osler 1892, cited in the James Lind Library
http://www.jameslindlibrary.org/). 
Today we know that this practice was responsible for
killing hundreds of thousands of people! 
What lessons may be learnt from these examples?
Firstly, they illustrate the enormous power of personal
testimony. People who subject themselves to colonic
cleansing ‘know’ they are healthier and live longer, and
experienced clinicians ‘knew’ that leeches were good
for their patients - they had seen it with their own eyes!
While it can be tempting to draw conclusions from per-
sonal experience or anecdotes, it must be kept in mind
that anecdotal evidence suffers from serious limitations.
Anecdotes can tell us that a certain outcome can occur
but provide no information on how frequently that out-
come occurs or whether an intervention can influence
the frequency of the outcome. Secondly, these exam-
ples show how personal experience can collude with
theory in leading us astray. In both situations an illusion
of certainty was created by clinical observations being
filtered through a distorted lens of incomplete or faulty
understanding of the functions of the human body.
Lastly, we learn something about the phenomenon of
“positive bias.” When a treatment is being evaluated
there are at least three parties with an interest in the
outcome - the patient, the clinician and those that prof-
it commercially from the use of the treatment - and all
three parties want to believe (though for different rea-
sons) that the treatment works! In this situation evi-
dence that a given treatment may be ineffective or
harmful may be most unwelcome. 
Given the inherent biases that bedevil the process of
evaluation of care, it should be clear that specific steps
are necessary to avoid the dangers of being misled.
Historically, clinical epidemiology is the field most di-
rectly concerned with this challenge.  
CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY
M
ost simply put, clinical epidemiology is the use of
scientific methods in the evaluation of clinical
practice. The field involves the study of diagnostic meth-
ods, disease prognosis, the benefits and risks of health
care interventions, and factors that influence profes-
sional practice. Time, this evening, allows only for some
limited remarks on treatment evaluation. 
It should be declared at the start that clinical epi-
demiology is rooted in the scientific ideas of Francis
Bacon, the 16th-century English philosopher who intro-
duced the school of inductive reasoning (Vickers B,
2002). Bacon taught that truth should be sought
through observation, experiment and testing hypothe-
ses (empirical methods) in the real world and not on
theory or “higher insight.” Before Bacon deductive logic
- i.e. reason based on first principles (rationalism) - was
regarded as a sufficient basis for obtaining knowledge.
Importantly, Bacon pointed to the dangers of bias in
5the pursuit of knowledge. He spoke of the need for
investigators to free their minds of “idols” before start-
ing induction and mentioned four kinds: 1) “Idols of the
Tribe”, which were common to the human race; 2)
“Idols of the Den”, which were peculiar to the individ-
ual; 3) “Idols of the Marketplace” from the misuse of lan-
guage (which today might be referred to as “spin”; and
4) “Idols of the Theatre” from the abuse of authority As
we shall see later, these concepts are as relevant today
as they were in the 1500s. 
THE EVOLUTION OF EMPIRICAL
METHODS FOR EVALUATING
HEALTH CARE 
I
will now briefly trace the evolution of empirical meth-
ods for evaluating treatments in health care. The
James Lind Library which has brilliantly documented this
development under the title of “fair tests of treatments
in health care” will serve as the primary source for the
material presented in this section (http://www.james-
lindlibrary.org/).
Learning to make comparisons 
In medicine the first study involving a comparative (con-
trolled) evaluation of treatment was conducted in 1747.
At the time thousands of British sailors were dying at
sea from scurvy, a disease that we know today is the
result of a lack of vitamin C. Then, the cause of scurvy
was not known and many treatments were being used
to cure the disease. James Lind, a naval surgeon, decid-
ed to conduct a controlled trial to evaluate six of these
therapies. He took 12 patients who were at a similar
stage of scurvy, had a similar diet and were housed in
similar parts of the ship on which he served and allo-
cated them in pairs to the following treatments: a quart
of cider a day; two spoonfuls of vinegar three times a
day; 25 gutts of elixir vitriol three times a day; half a pint
of sea-water daily; a concoction of nutmeg, mustard and
garlic three times a day; and two oranges and a lemon
every day. Lind’s trial clearly demonstrated what the
best treatment was. He reported: 
“the consequence was, that the most sudden and vis-
ible good effects were perceived from the use of
oranges and lemons; one of those who had taken
them, being at the end of six days fit for duty” 
(Milne and Chalmers 2004). 
Sadly, it took another 50 years for the Admiralty to
sanction the provision of lemon juice in the navy. With-
in two years scurvy was virtually eliminated from the
Royal Navy (Milne and Chalmers 2004). 
Control groups are important for conducting reli-
able assessments of the effects of treatment, because
they help us take account of two common situations: 1)
people sometimes recover from illness without any
treatment at all, and 2) natural fluctuations in the course
of a disease may make it seem that a treatment is help-
ing or hurting when in reality it is having no effect at all.
Comparing the experience of those receiving a particu-
lar treatment with that of people not so treated there-
fore helps reduce the likelihood of falsely attributing a
particular clinical outcome to the effect of treatment. 
Claude Bernard, the famous French physiologist, un-
derscored the importance of this principle in 1866: 
“Comparative experience is a prerequisite for exper-
imental and scientific medicine, otherwise the physi-
cian may walk at random and become the sport of a
thousand illusions” 
(cited inTrohler 2000).
Making unbiased comparisons 
While the use of controls was an important step for-
ward in the evaluation of care, a further challenge need-
ed to be met. A way needed to be found to ensure that
people in comparison groups were similar enough at
baseline so that any differences in clinical outcomes
could be confidently attributed to treatment rather than
to other factors, such as differences in illness severity
between the groups.
Early methods involved allocating patients to experi-
mental or control groups using clinical judgment or
alternate allocation methods (using for example the day
of the week), but none of these methods was good
enough. The major advance finally came in the 1940s,
when the medical statistician Sir Austin Bradford Hill
succeeded in convincing the British MRC to use a truly
random method for allocating patients with pulmonary
tuberculosis to receive either streptomycin or placebo.
Bradford Hill’s method was innovative for two reasons:
1) chance alone decided on who got what treatment;
and 2) investigators could not tell what treatment
groups patients had been assigned to until they had been
admitted to the study. This first known randomised con-
trolled trial was published in the BMJ in 1948 and to this
day that particular study design remains the ‘gold stan-
dard’ for evaluating interventions. The reason for this is
simple: randomisation is the only means we have for
ensuring that all known and unknown factors influencing
clinical outcomes are equally distributed between groups
receiving alternative forms of treatment and thus for
ensuring the comparison of like with like. 
Of course, other methods were introduced at vari-
ous times that have also contributed to reducing bias in
treatment evaluation. Placebos, for instance, had been
used in Russia as early as the 1800s to distinguish
between the results of active treatment and the non-
specific effects of “dummy” treatments.  The method of
“blinding” i.e. preventing providers, patients or those
assessing the outcome of treatment from knowing the
actual treatment being administered was known to have
been used from the late 18th century onwards. But none
of these strategies were as important as randomisation. 
Dealing with the play of chance
Those evaluating the effects of treatment found that, in
addition to various forms of bias, a further source of
error could bedevil the interpretation or research viz.
random variation (a.k.a. the “play of chance”). It was dis-
covered that, even if the same study was repeated over
and over again, the findings ended up being different
every time purely due to chance.  
Figure 2 illustrates this problem. The figure shows
the results of several trials evaluating the effect of strep-
tokinase (a clot-buster drug) on the risk of death in
people newly diagnosed with a heart attack (Collins and
MacMahon 2001). What you see in the figure is that
some studies show that the treatment is beneficial (the
little block is the left of the solid vertical line) while
other studies find that treatment is harmful (the little
block is to the right of the solid vertical line). What is
the practitioner to make of these findings? How are
they to be interpreted? It turns out that there is no real
difference between these results; the variation you see
is due to the play of chance which is a common occur-
rence in small studies. 
Over time it was found that the problem of chance
variation could be overcome by improving the precision
of study findings by either conducting a large enough
study or by combining the results of a number of small-
er studies if they are sufficiently similar (known as meta-
analysis). The diamonds in figure 2 illustrate this. They
show that either one of the two large studies or a meta-
analysis of all the smaller studies provides unequivocal
evidence that streptokinase reduces mortality. 
Using scientific methods to sum up 
existing evidence 
Reliable evidence about whether a treatment works will
very rarely come from a single trial. What is usually
needed is a synthesis of all studies that have evaluated
the effects of the treatment. But this not a trivial exer
cise for a variety of reasons including the following: 
1) access to research is often biased, because studies
with positive or dramatic results are more likely to be
published than negative studies, bibliographic databases
do not provide comprehensive coverage of the litera-
ture, and studies may be selectively cited due to per-
sonal prejudices or commercial interests; 2) poor-qual-
ity studies are published that draw incorrect conclu-
sions; and 3) many studies are too small to be conclu-
sive (Volmink et al. 2004).
In response to these obstacles a scientific method-
ology for conducting research syntheses, known as the
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Figure 2:  Does administration of streptokinase
reduce mortality in patients with acute MI?
Collins R, MacMahon S. The Lancet;
Vol 357; February 3, 2001
systematic review, has evolved. A systematic review can
be defined as 
“a review in which bias has been reduced by the sys-
tematic identification, appraisal, synthesis, and, if rel-
evant, statistical aggregation of all relevant studies on
a specific topic according to a predetermined and
explicit method” 
(Moher et al. 1999).  
The Cochrane Collaboration, a non-profit organisation,
provides a global infrastructure for preparing and main-
taining systematic reviews of the effects of health care
interventions (http://www.cochrane.org/). Formed at a
meeting of 90 people in Oxford in 1993, the Cochrane
Collaboration now involves about 15 000 people from
almost 100 countries. Cochrane reviews are subjected
to a rigorous peer review, following which they are pub-
lished electronically in The Cochrane Library (http://
www.thecochranelibrary.com/).
Locally, the Cochrane Collaboration is represented
by the South African Cochrane Centre (http://www.
mrc.ac.za/cochrane/cochrane.htm). This Centre has
existed as an intra-mural Unit of the Medical Research
Council for nearly 10 years. As the only Cochrane
Centre in Africa, it provides training and support to
people across sub-Saharan Africa who wish to conduct
Cochrane reviews. The Centre’s primary focus is to
facilitate the preparation of up-to-date systematic re-
views of interventions for high priority health condi-
tions in Africa, especially HIV and tuberculosis.
CONFRONTING THE ILLUSION OF
CERTAINTY - EXPERIENCES IN THE
SCIENTIFIC ERA
I
n the final part of this talk I would like to show, using
a few recent examples, how the methods I have briefly
described earlier can be used to confront certainty
regarding the effects of health care interventions.  As I
do so, it would be worth keeping in mind the four
“idols” of Sir Francis Bacon, which you may recall are: 
1) “Idols of the Tribe” (common to the human race); 
2) “Idols of the Den” (peculiar to the individual);
3) “Idols of the Marketplace” (misuse of language or
‘spin’); and 
4) “Idols of the Theatre” (abuse of authority). 
Example 1: Certainty based on clinical experience
Eclampsia is a serious complication in pregnant women
characterised by high blood pressure, proteinuria and
convulsions. Every year an estimated 50 000 women die
of eclampsia and 99% of these deaths occur in develop-
ing countries (Duley 1992). The pathophysiology of the
condition is not yet well understood. 
In 1925 an American obstetrician reported a case
series of 20 women with eclampsia in which magnesium
sulphate was considered to have improved clinical out-
comes. Magnesium sulphate was subsequently adopted
by some obstetricians for treating eclampsia, but over
the years (also based on clinical experience) other treat-
ments, such as phenytoin, diazepam or a ‘lytic cocktail’,
were introduced.  For many years clinicians fiercely con-
tested each other for the therapeutic high ground, with
each being more sure than others of the correctness of
their approach. A large, multicentre, randomised trial
published in the Lancet in 1995 finally settled the debate
(Eclampsia Trial Collaborative Group 1995). 
As can be seen in figure 3 the Collaborative Eclamp-
sia Trial found that women receiving magnesium sul-
phate had a 52% lower risk of recurrent convulsions
than those receiving diazepam and also had a lower risk
of death. Women allocated to treatment with magne-
sium sulphate also had a 67% lower risk of recurrent
convulsions and a lower risk of death than those allo-
cated to phenytoin. Magnesium sulphate can now be
recommended as the anticonvulsant of choice for 
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8women with eclampsia - decades too late for thousands
of women who had died as a result of receiving inferior
treatment. 
An editorial reflecting on this experience and draw-
ing attention to the need for reliable evidence summed
up the situation rather elegantly: 
“For 70 years, the proponents of various drugs and
drug cocktails have hurled disdainful abuse at each
other from separate mountain tops, secure in the
knowledge that no strong evidence existed that could
undermine any one of their multitude of conflicting
opinions” 
(Chalmers and Grant 1996).
Example 2: Certainty based on understanding 
of pathophysiology
It has long been known that there is a high rate of death
in the early period following a heart attack, with the
highest risk in the first 24 hours. People who develop
abnormal heart rhythms during this time are four times
more likely to die than those with regular heart beats.
Over the years studies in pigs and in humans found that
abnormal beats could be suppressed by a group of drugs
called class I anti-arrhythmic drugs. Based on these
studies the drugs were routinely used as prophylactic
treatment in patients with heart attack. 
When randomised trials were conducted years later,
it was found that patients receiving anti-arrhythmics had
beautifully controlled heart rhythms, but to everyone’s
surprise they were, nonetheless, more likely to die than
those patients receiving a placebo (Figure 4) (Echt et al.
1991). It has been estimated that between 20 000 and 
70 000 people died as a result of this treatment during
the late 1980s in the United States alone (Moore 1995). 
This example is a powerful reminder that theoreti-
cal knowledge alone does not automatically lead to the
introduction of effective treatment. 
Example 3: Certainty based on the influence 
of the health care industry  
It is widely believed that nutritional supplements are
good for one’s health. These supplements are widely
promoted as “antioxidants” to be taken as a preventive
Figure 4: The Cardiac Arrhythmia
Suppression Trial
Figure 5: Risk
difference in
all-cause mor-
tality for ran-
domized, con-
trolled trials of
vitamin E sup-
plementation
and pooled
results for low-
dosage (<400
IU/d) and high-
dosage
(&ge;400 IU/d)
vitamin E trials Miller et al. Ann Intern Med 2005;142:37-46
treatment for a variety of chronic diseases. Dietary sup-
plements usually consist of a mixture of vitamins C and
E, carotenoids and other phytochemicals and plant ex-
tracts. Currently a third of all adults in the US and half
of all those older than 55 years report taking supple-
ments daily. In 2003 sales of supplements accounted for
$19 billion in the US alone. Not everyone is convinced
of the value of dietary supplements, but even some
sceptics hold the view that supplements “won’t hurt and
they might help”. But what does the evidence show? 
Vitamin E is the most widely used product and is
taken daily as specific supplementation (usually as 400
IU of alpha-tocopherol). A recently published systemat-
ic review evaluated the evidence from 19 RCTs with
almost 136 000 patients - 9 tested vitamin E alone and
10 tested vitamin E combined with other vitamins and
minerals (Figure 5). The review found that overall vita-
min E had no effect on survival. Of considerable con-
cern was the finding that death rates were higher in
people taking high-dose vitamins (>400 IU/d) compared
with controls (Miller et al. 2005). 
The review is not unusual in finding that nutritional
supplements may be harmful. In a similar synthesis of
randomised trials it was found that the risk of cardio-
vascular death was higher in those taking supplements
containing beta-carotene compared with those receiv-
ing a placebo (Egger et al. 1998) (Figure 6).
Should healthy people taking nutritional supple-
ments be worried about this evidence? Probably. Will
people stop taking them? Not if big business can help it!  
Example 4: Certainty based on the opinion of
health authorities (policy makers)
My final example relates to DOTS (directly observed
therapy, short-course), a 5-point strategy for delivering
care to patients with tuberculosis. The DOTS strategy
is, in the main, a sensible approach for improving the
management of people with tuberculosis. However, it
includes one intervention (directly observed therapy or
DOT) that can be considered controversial. The WHO
believes that a policy in which patients are watched
while they swallow their tablets (directly observed ther-
apy) is crucial for ensuring successful treatment. In 1997
the World Health Organisation released a press state-
ment in which the Director-General claimed that the
policy of DOTS was the “biggest health care break-
through of this decade” and the “single most important
development in the fight [against tuberculosis]….since
Robert Koch discovered the TB bacillus in 1882”. He
further claimed that there was “overwhelming evi-
dence” from studies in USA, Asia and Africa that direct-
ly observed therapy was effective. I decided to respond
to these assertions by conducting a Cochrane review
with Paul Garner in Liverpool as a research partner. We
found that, although some adherence promoting inter-
ventions had been evaluated in randomised trials, no tri-
als of directly observed therapy (DOT) had ever been
done (Volmink and Garner 1997).  
We also carried out a systematic review of observa-
tional studies reporting on TB programmes in which
DOT had been used (Volmink et al. 2000). This review
included 32 studies and found that in all settings DOT
was only one of several interventions introduced so
that any potential effect of DOT will have been highly
confounded by the effects of co-interventions. 
Since the publication of our first Cochrane review on
this topic nine years ago, I am pleased to say 10 RCTs of
DOT including nearly 4 000 participants have been con-
ducted. What can we conclude from this evidence? I
quote from our most recent Cochrane review update: 
“The results of randomised controlled trials conduct-
ed in low-, middle- and high-income countries provide
no assurance that directly observed therapy com-
pared with self-administered treatment has any
quantitatively important effect on cure or treatment
completion in people receiving treatment for tuber-
culosis” 
(Volmink and Garner 2006). 
Is it reasonable to expect that the WHO will respond
favourably to this evidence? Of course not! 
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Figure 6: Beta-carotene supplementation
and cardiovascular mortality
CONCLUSION
I
would like to conclude with a few caveats. In this talk
I have drawn attention to the dangers of basing judg-
ments about the effects of treatment on personal testi-
mony. This is not to denigrate personal experience as a
form of knowledge; it can be extremely valuable. There
are even situations in which personal experience or
clinical observation can provide conclusive evidence,
e.g. where the effect of a treatment is dramatic.
However, for practical purposes it is safer to regard
personal testimony as an entry point for deciding on
whether treatment might be beneficial rather than view-
ing it as proof. 
Furthermore, in my comments regarding theory-
based knowledge I did not mean to be dismissive of
theory. Many of the advances in modern medicine have
resulted from improved understanding of pathophysiol-
ogy. However, it is important to keep in mind that the-
oretical knowledge can be wrong and must not be
expected to lead automatically to effective treatment. 
I hope I’ve succeeded in making the case for the
value of empirical methods in the evaluation of health
care interventions. However, if I’ve created the impres-
sion that clinical epidemiology is the “Holy Grail” that
will open the door to certain knowledge then I apolo-
gise. I must remind you once again of Franklin’s Law
which says: “In this world nothing is certain except
death and taxes.” Certainty belongs to the realm of dog-
ma only; in making decisions of any kind there is only
probability. The most clinical epidemiology can hope to
achieve is helping us estimate the likelihood of an inter-
vention being effective. It is only one form of knowl-
edge, albeit a more objective form than personal expe-
rience or theory. But it is certainly fallible, which is why
I end by pointing to the need for humility, borrowing
the words of Xenophanes, Greek Philosopher of the
6th century BC: 
“Through seeking we may learn and know things bet-
ter. But as for certain truth no man hath known it,
for all is but a woven web of guesses.” 
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